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Introduction
The aim of this article is to articulate the concepts of 
familialism and defamilialization in relation to wel-
fare state arrangements to examine whether and how 
welfare states differ not only in the way (via state or 
market) and the degree to which they are defamilial-
ized but also in the specific familialism form(s). 
Specifically, the aim is to assess whether family 
responsibility in a given area is only assumed without 
public policy support or, on the contrary, whether it is 
actively enforced by laws or supported by income 
transfers, time allocation and so forth. Based on 
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selected indicators of different policy areas and needs, 
I articulate these concepts to compare four countries 
– Italy and Spain in Europe, Korea and Japan in East 
Asia – which are in the welfare state literature often 
identified as examples of familialistic welfare states.
In the first section, based on a critical overview of 
the debates that have led to the introduction of the 
concepts of defamilialization and familialism in wel-
fare state studies, I discuss different dimensions 
involved in the familialism–defamilialization con-
tinuum and their likely indicators, suggesting a more 
articulated conceptualization compared to those cur-
rently available in the literature. Against this back-
ground, in the second section, I analyse the profiles 
of Italy, Japan, Korea and Spain, looking at various 
areas of policy intervention involving expectations 
about gender, intergenerational responsibilities and 
obligations within the household and the larger fam-
ily. The emerging varieties of familialism as well as 
patterns of defamilialization in the four countries are 
discussed in the conclusion.
The contribution offered by this article is, there-
fore, twofold. First, it contributes to the theoretical 
debate on familialism and defamilialization in welfare 
state analysis through developing a richer conceptual-
ization that accounts for the different directions of a 
familialistic policy approach. Second, by implement-
ing this conceptualization in the analysis of four coun-
tries commonly identified as familialistic, based on a 
complex set of indicators that go beyond those com-
monly used in comparative analyses, it documents the 
benefit of using such conceptualization for compara-
tive analyses of countries and policies, contributing 
also to the overcoming of the limitations of the "wel-
fare modelling business" (Powell and Kim (2014)).
Polysemic concepts
Feminist scholars who, taking Esping-Andersen’s 
(1990) regime approach seriously, criticized the gen-
der blindness of his conceptualization, exposing 
the gender arrangements that underpin all three areas 
of the welfare regime, that is, the state, the market and 
the family, as well as their relationships, developed 
the twin concepts of familialism and defamilialization 
as dimensions of welfare state arrangements. Building 
on theory and research that had started to unveil the 
gender-specific dimensions of the foundations of 
European welfare states, Lewis (1992) and Lewis and 
Ostner (1994; see also Sainsbury 1999) argued that 
welfare regime typologies should be based on the 
strength or weakness of the male breadwinner model. 
Orloff (1993; see also Lister 1994 and Saraceno, 
1997) suggested that in order to construct a welfare 
regime typology, the commodification–decommodifi-
cation axis should be integrated with the familialism–
defamilialization axis. Although they focused 
primarily on the degrees and patterns of defamilializa-
tion rather than familialism, these developments 
opened the way for the identification of familialism as 
a heavy reliance on a gendered and intergeneration-
ally structured family solidarity (not only the house-
hold but also close kin; see, for example, Naldini, 
2003) as a specific characteristic of southern European 
welfare regimes. The term was later adopted also by 
scholars of East Asian welfare regimes (e.g. Estevez-
Abe and Kim, 2014; Jones, 1993; Phillips and Jung 
2013 and, from a specific gender perspective, Peng, 
2002).
The first scholars who adopted the gendered 
concept of defamilialization emphasized the ability 
of women to support themselves without relying on 
a male breadwinner either through participation in 
the labour market or through individual entitle-
ments as mothers (Hobson, 1994; Orloff, 1993). 
Lister (1994) defined the concept as ‘the degree to 
which individuals can uphold a socially acceptable 
standard of living independently of family relation-
ships, either through paid work or social security 
provision’. Although originally developed with a 
focus on women, the concept of defamilialization 
was later extended to all adults, particularly to the 
young, vulnerable and elderly members of both 
genders.
Over the years, the familialism–defamilialization 
dichotomy has been used particularly to analyse the 
patterns of care provision. The focus on the ability to 
form one’s own household has therefore remained 
marginal. Although reductive, this focus has never-
theless served to enrich welfare regime analyses 
(and typologies), which were until then largely based 
on a few, mostly labour-linked, income transfers and 
tended to ignore the service sector (Alber, 1995). In 
particular, when analysing patterns of care provision 
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– whether relative to children or other dependent 
persons – it is apparent that they always involve a 
combination of different providers among whom the 
family and its gender arrangement play an important 
role. The concept of social care (Daly and Lewis, 
1998) has been developed precisely from this insight. 
Furthermore, conceptions of family obligations 
emerge much more clearly when policies involve 
child and elderly care rather than any other areas of 
welfare.
The focus on care has also helped to further 
articulate the familialism–defamilialization dichot-
omy and the concept of familialism itself, distin-
guishing between (defamilializing) policies that 
liberate families (women) from a share of the 
needed caring work and policies that, on the con-
trary, help families (whether only women or women 
and men) provide care (Leitner, 2003; Saraceno, 
1997). In fact, defamilialization is not the only way 
in which policies may – and do – assist families and 
individuals with their needs. Policies may also pro-
vide time and money to allow families and indi-
viduals to provide care.
Further elaborating on Korpi’s (2000), Leitner’s 
(2003), Leitner and Lessenich’s (2007), Saraceno’s 
(2010) and Saraceno and Keck’s (2010, 2011) con-
ceptual frameworks, different patterns can be distin-
guished on the familialization–defamilialization 
continuum. These are not based simply on care provi-
sion indicators, but also on the way in which the insti-
tutional framework implies, prescribes, supports and/
or reduces family obligations along gender and inter-
generational lines. The different patterns reflect spe-
cific policy areas; however, according to the overall 
balance in a given country (or group of countries) at 
a given time, they also reflect welfare regime pro-
files. These patterns may be defined as familialism 
by default, prescribed familialism, supported famil-
ialism, supported defamilialization through the mar-
ket and defamilialization through public provision.
Familialism by default, or unsupported familial-
ism, occurs when there are no, or very scarce, pub-
licly provided alternatives to family care and/or 
financial support for needy family members. It can 
also translate into defamilialization through the mar-
ket when individuals and families use their own pri-
vate resources to buy market care or education 
services as well as health or old age insurances that 
are not provided by public policies.
Prescribed familialism occurs when civil law pre-
scribes financial or care obligations within the gen-
erational chain and kinship networks.
Supported familialism occurs when policies, usu-
ally through direct or indirect (via taxation) financial 
transfers, help individuals within families uphold 
their financial and/or caring responsibilities. While 
familialism by default clearly underpins gender and 
social class inequality, insofar as it leaves the family 
to provide care and use its financial resources, sup-
ported familialism has a more ambivalent effect, 
depending on the way in which it is framed. It may 
work to support the traditional gender division of 
labour and social class asymmetry. This may happen 
in the case of taxation favourable to financially asym-
metrical couples, long parental leaves reserved to or 
used mostly by mothers, or payments for care that 
may be attractive to low-income women, incentiviz-
ing them to leave their own jobs. However, supported 
familialism may also operate to rebalance some of 
that gender asymmetry, for instance, with paternity 
leave or incentives for fathers to share the parental 
leave (Leira, 1998; Saraceno, 1997; Saraceno and 
Keck, 2011). Unlike what Korpi (2000) argued, sup-
ported familialism does not always imply keeping 
women at home. On the contrary, it may incentivize 
men to take time off to care. Depending on the level of 
generosity, supported familialism in the form of finan-
cial transfers for the costs of bringing up children may 
also reduce the risk of poverty for families with chil-
dren, thereby reducing social inequality. In insurance-
based welfare states, supported familialism may also 
represent a way of extending protection to the non-
insured by acknowledging them as dependent family 
members.
Supported defamilialization through the market 
occurs when income transfers are provided (in the 
form of cash benefits, vouchers or tax deductions) to 
help buy services on the market or when the state (or 
local government) funds the provision of services 
via the market instead of providing them directly. It 
can also occur through compulsory occupational 
welfare.
Defamilialization through public provision occurs 
when the individualization of social rights (e.g. with 
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regard to minimum income provision, unemploy-
ment benefits for the young or entitlement to higher 
education or to receiving care) reduces family 
responsibilities and dependencies. Concerning care, 
it occurs when it is performed by public or publicly 
financed and regulated services.
Some forms of familialism by default, prescribed 
familialism, supported familialism and different 
forms of defamilialization, may be found in every 
country. Cross-country differences involve the over-
all balance between these tendencies and the specific 
areas in which one approach is favoured over another.
Of course, familialism and defamilialization are not 
only policy features. They may be rooted in, or at least 
legitimized by, cultural attitudes and values, which in 
turn inspire not only policies but also individual behav-
iours (e.g. Budig et al., 2012; Van Oorschot et al., 
2008). This dimension is addressed in Estevez-Abe 
and Naldini’s contribution to this issue, and I will 
therefore not elaborate on it here. I will only mention 
that without under-evaluating the role of culture and 
attitudes in shaping both individual behaviour and 
welfare regime arrangements, the symmetrical role of 
welfare (and civil law) arrangements in shaping expec-
tations and behaviours irrespective of values and atti-
tudes should not be underestimated (see also Teo, 
2013). This is a well-known argument in welfare state 
analyses from a gender perspective. In familialist wel-
fare regimes, references to familial values may be used 
as a device to legitimize the absence or scarcity of 
policies. Familialist attitudes and behaviours may 
emerge as a consequence rather than a cause of a lack 
of alternatives (see also Calzada and Brooks, 2013). 
Furthermore, as other authors suggested, culture is not 
a set of shared meanings that propels human actions in 
a coherent and homogeneous way, but a ‘repertoire’ or 
‘tool-kit’ from which individual actors construct their 
strategies of action (e.g. Swidler, 2001). Reference to 
family values may be instrumental not only for policy 
makers to legitimate their choices but also for actors 
(e.g. women) wishing to change existing policies in 
their favour and argue their case in a context domi-
nated by familialistic discourses.
In the following exercise aimed at discussing the 
similarities and differences between and within 
South European and East Asian welfare regimes 
along the familialism–defamilialization axis, I will 
focus on policy arrangements, looking at what is 
directly or indirectly expected from the family along 
the intergenerational and gender lines.
What we know based on existing 
comparative exercises
A first look at the (unfortunately not fully updated) 
data on public expenditure towards what the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) restrictively defines as family 
policies (i.e. income transfers and services linked to 
the presence of children) confirms that these four 
countries invest comparatively less in this area com-
pared to most OECD countries (Figure 1). This sug-
gests the prevalence of familialism in all four 
countries, possibly integrated with a relatively high 
degree of prescribed familialism. However, the data 
also show that both the level of expenditure and its 
distribution between services (defamilialization) and 
transfers (supported familialism) differ. Italy displays 
the greatest generosity and balance between sup-
ported familialism and defamilialization, although 
with a preference for the former, followed by Japan, 
where the prevalence of supported familialism is 
more accentuated. Spain follows, with a lower degree 
of generosity but a higher incidence of services. 
Korea appears the least generous, but with a clear 
preference for services.
Using a dynamic perspective, in their analysis of 
changes in the child-related family policy in rich 
OECD countries from the 1990s to the 2000s, 
Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser (2014) suggested that 
the present similarities between Italy and Japan 
(Spain and Korea unfortunately were not included in 
their analysis) might be the outcome of different 
trends in the two countries over the observed period. 
According to their findings, Italy had made almost no 
changes, remaining in the lower section of what they 
defined as the ‘Christian democratic space’, while 
Japan had moved from the residualist liberal space to 
the Christian democratic one. In this perspective, the 
similarities between Italy and Japan are not the result 
of immobility from both countries, but of the immo-
bility of the former and of an important (third level, 
according to the authors who indirectly confirmed 
Peng’s (2002) analysis) change of the latter. The 
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same may have happened with Korea, which, accord-
ing to Thévenon’s (2011) analysis, was the OECD 
country that provided the least support to families 
with children in 2007 but substantially increased its 
expenditure in this policy area in the following years 
(see Lee and Baek, 2014) and also with Spain (see 
León and Migliavacca, 2013; Naldini and Jurado, 
2013, for an Italy–Spain comparison).
Other papers in this issue look precisely at these 
dynamics and at their drivers. Given its aim to test 
empirically the conceptual framework presented 
above, the following analysis is limited to the pre-
sent-day situation in selected policy areas, keeping 
the long-term dynamic period in mind only to point 
out the differences in the starting points. The indica-
tors considered in this study comprise a richer and 
more diversified set of dimensions than those found 
in the comparative literature, which usually special-
izes only on a few areas or policies. The policy fields 
under scrutiny concern the division of responsibili-
ties between families and the state with regard to 
income support for adults and children and non-
healthcare needs of pre-school children and the frail 
elderly. The following analysis focuses also on pat-
terns, not only on degrees of familialism and defa-
milialization in the selected areas. It looks not only 
at coverage rates but also at the implicit or explicit 
norms concerning family obligations informing 
institutional regulations. It is intended not as a sys-
tematically complete comparative analysis, but 
rather as an exercise to show the heuristic usefulness 
of the proposed conceptualization.
Income support responsibilities
In all four countries, responsibility for income support 
in case of the need of not only underage children and 
spouses but also adult children and other family mem-
bers is attributed mainly to the family through the 
legal institution of obliged kin and through very 
reduced or absent income support schemes in case of 
poverty. Conversely, public income support for under-
age children through child allowances and/or child-
related tax deductions is comparatively low. There 
are, however, notable cross-country differences.
Income support in case of need: a family 
responsibility
All four countries under examination display com-
paratively extensive prescribed familialism, with 
Italy taking the first place for both the range 
Figure 1. Public spending on family benefits in cash, services and tax measures, in percent of GDP, 2011.
Source: OECD family database: public spending on family benefits. PF 1.1.
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of relationships involved and the duration of the 
obligations. According to article 433 of the civil 
code, there is no limit to parents’ financial respon-
sibility towards their children in case of need, irre-
spective of the children’s age. If parents are absent 
or financially incapable, grandparents, aunts and 
uncles may be called. In turn, adult children have 
financial responsibility towards a parent in need 
and towards a parent-in-law. Siblings are also 
reciprocally responsible. Common residence is not 
required to activate these obligations. Italy is also 
the only country out of the four examined in this 
study that lacks a minimum income provision regu-
lated at the national level. Fragmented and hetero-
geneous measures exist only at the local level.
Spain used to have a similar set of obligations. 
Following a recent reform that partly reduced them, 
they now include, in addition to partners (including 
same-sex ones), obligations of parents towards chil-
dren (including adult children at times of need inde-
pendent from their responsibility), of children 
towards parents and of second-grade relatives when 
first-grade ones are missing or unable to provide 
(European Judicial Network, 2015). Although a 
national framework law requires autonomous 
regions to provide a minimum income for the poor, 
patterns of implementation vary greatly across 
regions (Cabrero and Gregorio, 2009), and they have 
been restricted further following the financial crisis.
In Japan, Article 730 of Book 5 of the Civil Code 
stipulates: ‘Lineal relatives by blood and the rela-
tives living together shall mutually cooperate’. This 
implies that in case of need, parents and children as 
well as siblings have reciprocal obligations, irre-
spective of residence, and that the same is true for 
other co-residents. Unlike Italy, Japan has a mini-
mum income provision. However, access is restricted 
not only by prescribed family solidarity but also by 
the ability to work. According to a report of the 
Japanese National Institute of Population and Social 
Security Research (2011: 41–9), an individual who 
is able to work but cannot find work is unlikely to 
receive public assistance. Single mothers are given 
preferential treatment with additional benefits.
Korea also used to have a similar range of obliga-
tions. However, a recent reform has limited them to 
reciprocal responsibilities between parents and children 
(including daughters-in-law and sons-in-law), exclud-
ing siblings and other relatives, even when cohabiting. 
This reform was intended to increase the access to social 
assistance, although it seems to have had only a limited 
effect, since family obligations remain substantial 
(Phillips and Jung, 2013).
Financial support for the cost of children
The data completeness and comparability are diffi-
cult to achieve in this area when considering the 
many cross-country differences in eligibility rules 
and taxation systems. The available OECD data 
(OECD Family Database PF1.3, n.d.) indicate that 
the four countries offer little financial support 
through child-related direct or indirect transfers to 
families with children, as compared not only to many 
European Union (EU) countries but also to other 
OECD countries. Children’s financial maintenance 
in these four countries therefore appears to be a typi-
cal case of familialism by default.
In Italy, Japan and Spain, child allowances are 
means-tested, with more generous compensation 
offered in Italy and Japan. In the latter country, the 
government then in office introduced a universal 
child benefit for children under 15 in 2010, eliminat-
ing the child-related tax deduction, but it reverted to 
a means-tested one in 2012 (without re-introducing 
the child-related tax deduction) due to not only the 
strong opposition by the conservative party but also 
lack of a strong popular support (Abe, 2014). The 
income threshold, however, is high, thus including a 
large part of families, and the allowance value is 
about 4 percent of the average wage (higher for third 
children and above and for children under 7).1 In 
Italy, the child allowance is only available for house-
holds with taxable income derived from wages for at 
least 70 percent of the total earned income. Self-
employed and long-term unemployed people are 
therefore excluded. Its amount varies with the house-
hold income and size, up to an income threshold. The 
value of the maximum child benefit is equivalent to 
3.9 percent of the average wage. There are also tax 
deductions for dependent children, but they are non-
refundable, that is, the poorer do not benefit from 
them. In Spain, the child benefit for low-income 
households is 1.9 percent of the average wage, and 
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there is no additional tax deduction. In Korea, there is 
no child benefit as such. Within the tax system, how-
ever, there is a tax deduction equivalent to roughly 
€777 for each child under 20, with an additional 
equivalent exemption for children under 7. The 
deduction is non-refundable, but low-income house-
hold may receive a negative income tax equivalent to 
about half this amount.
In this field, the space for familialism by default 
appears overall greater in Spain. Korea and Japan 
choose two different instruments of supported famil-
ialism, the former favouring tax deductions and the 
latter favouring (means-tested) child allowances. 
Furthermore, both countries favour young children 
and large families. Italy offers a mixed picture, as 
child benefit and child-linked tax deductions work in 
opposite ways, the former favouring low-income 
wage workers’ households and the latter favouring 
families that are better off. In addition, the household 
means test disincentivizes mothers’ participation in 
the labour market in low-income households.
Who is responsible for non-health 
care?
Policies in the area of non-health care usually involve 
a combination of supported familialistic and defa-
milializing measures, leaving more or less space for 
familialism by default. This combination varies not 
only across countries but also by whether it concerns 
children or the frail old.
Childcare
Childcare needs may be publicly supported through 
the provision of leaves for parents or through the 
provision of services. Although it has become a 
standard practice in comparative studies to integrate 
the adjusted (for the level of compensation) leave 
length and childcare services coverage to assess the 
overall public efforts to support parents of very 
young children, these two means differ in the behav-
iour that they elicit or support. In particular, while 
leaves are a form of supported familialism, services 
represent a form of defamilialization.
Let us turn first to maternity, paternity and paren-
tal leaves. In order to assess and compare the leaves 
systems available, one must consider distinctly the 
length and compensation of maternity, paternity and 
parental leave. Italy is the most generous in terms of 
maternity leave length, with 21.7 weeks, as com-
pared to 16 in Spain, 14 in Japan and 12 in Korea. 
Japan, Korea and Spain are the most generous in 
terms of length of (optional) parental leave, but 
Spain is the least generous in its compensation, as 
the leave is entirely unpaid (OECD Family Database 
PF 2.1, n.d.). Finally, Italy, Japan and Spain use a 
form of supported familialism to incentivize a rebal-
ancing of the gender roles in parenthood by provid-
ing either a paid paternity leave of more than 1 week 
or a reserved quota for fathers within the parental 
leave, while Korea offers only a few days. In this 
respect, the most generous country in terms of dura-
tion is Italy, which provides an implicit reserved 
quota of 4 months (with an additional bonus of an 
extra month), while the least generous is Spain, with 
only 2 weeks. In Italy, however, the parental leave, 
including the portion reserved to fathers, is compen-
sated at a maximum of 30 percent of the lost pay, 
while in Spain the 2 weeks are paid fully.
Considering the full-rate equivalent maternity and 
parental leaves (as calculated by the OECD) reserved 
for mothers, Japan appears as the most generous, 
with the equivalent of 31.3 weeks at full pay, fol-
lowed by Korea and Italy, with 27.4 and 25.1 weeks, 
respectively. Spain comes last, with 16 weeks (OECD 
Family Database PF 2.1, n.d.; see also León, Choi 
and Ahn, this issue). Of course, individuals may 
assess the trade-off between the level of compensa-
tion and the duration of the leave differently. 
Furthermore, from the point of view of a parent 
deciding whether he or she can afford to take a period 
of leave, what is important may not be the theoretical 
equivalized compensation, but the actual one for each 
period taken. For instance, according to Naldini and 
Jurado (2013), the lack of compensation for parental 
leave in Spain disincentivizes many mothers from 
taking it, while about 80 percent of fathers take the 
two fully paid weeks of paternity leave. In Italy, the 
low level of compensation deters many fathers from 
taking any share of the parental leave. Although it is 
not a totally objective measure, the full-rate equiva-
lent nevertheless gives an indication of the financial 
effort made by a country to support parents’ time to 
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care. From this perspective, Spain appears the coun-
try making the smallest effort.
It should be added that the proportion of workers 
covered might vary across countries, depending on 
regulations. While in EU countries a directive stipu-
lates that all female workers, irrespective of their kind 
of contract, should be entitled to a minimum maternity 
leave, only a small portion of workers in Korea – par-
ticularly women – are insured and therefore entitled to 
maternity and parental leaves (Lee and Baek, 2014).
Regarding childcare services, Korea and Spain 
are nowadays clearly different from Italy and Japan 
with regard to coverage for children under three. In 
fact, according to OECD data (Estevez-Abe and 
Kim, 2014; OECD Family Database PF 3.2, n.d.; see 
also Multilinks Database (2011) for the EU),2 Korea 
has enrolment rates near those of Scandinavian 
countries (although no full-time equivalent data are 
available for either Korea or Japan) in the zero-to-
three age bracket, with 50.5 percent, followed by 
Spain (39.3 percent). Japan and Italy are similar to 
one another at a much lower level (25.9 percent and 
24.2 percent, respectively). In Korea, mothers may 
also choose to receive a care allowance instead of 
sending a child to a childcare provider (Lee and 
Baek, 2014), evidencing a combination of a com-
paratively high defamilialization of the care in this 
age bracket with the option of highly gendered, sup-
ported familialism.
The situation looks quite different with regard to 
childcare for children between 3 and school age. 
Italy has since the late 1960s displayed a high cover-
age through its system of mostly public or publicly 
subsidized education focused kindergartens, on a par 
with the most generous EU countries, reaching in 
recent years 95 percent of all children in this age 
bracket. Starting from a lower level, Spain, with its 
99 percent coverage in recent years, has not only 
reached but surpassed Italy. These coverage levels 
are higher than Japan, where, in addition, the 90 per-
cent coverage is the outcome of a dual system, one 
targeted to children of working mothers who remain 
in the same kind of services reserved for younger 
children, the other, more focused on education and 
with shorter hours, for children of non-working 
mothers. Korea shows the lowest coverage (83.1 per-
cent) of the four countries for this age group.
No information on whether childcare services are 
public or private and whether the latter are publicly 
funded and regulated is available in the OECD data. 
It appears from other sources that services are mostly 
public or publicly financed and regulated in Italy and 
Spain, although there is also room for purely market-
based services, particularly for children under 3 years 
of age (Multilinks Database, 2011). Thus, defamil-
ialization through public provision seems to prevail 
in these two countries. In Korea and Japan, the cho-
sen route seems to be that of market subsidization, 
that is, of supported defamilialization through the 
market.
Considering parental leave and childcare policies 
together, Italy and Japan seem to be oriented towards 
supported familialism, with a high level of familial-
ism by default and a low degree of defamilialization, 
in the case of children under 3. Spain also demon-
strates a large degree of familialism by default, as its 
comparatively short leave is only partly balanced by 
defamilialization. Korea seems to be oriented 
towards a balance between supported familialism 
(with no gender recalibration) and supported defa-
milialization. For children between 3 and school age, 
all countries present much higher degrees of direct 
or supported defamilialization, albeit to a lesser 
extent in Korea.
Care for the frail old
This area of social policy has not been systemati-
cally included in family policy analyses and data-
bases (including the OECD family database), 
although caring for frail elderly family members 
(mostly parents) represents an important and grow-
ing part of the caring activities of adult (mainly 
female) family members. In fact, as noted in a recent 
OECD (2011) report on-long term care, on average, 
around 70–90 percent of those who provide care are 
family carers. Furthermore, these family carers are 
mostly women, wives, daughters and daughters-in-
law. Highly gendered familialism (by default or sup-
ported) appears the prevalent approach to caring for 
the frail elderly in developed countries, although to a 
varying degree. Figure 2 shows the cross-country 
differences (which are also reflected in expenditure 
data) with regard not only to the overall coverage by 
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public policies but also to the form they take, that is, 
institutionalization or home care. It would seem that 
Japan stands out for its higher degree of defamiliali-
zation (which is also higher than in France and 
Germany, despite sharing the latter’s institutional 
framework) favouring home care over institutionali-
zation. Spain and Korea have a similar (low) level of 
coverage but a slightly different internal composi-
tion, with a higher incidence of home care in Spain. 
The OECD data for Italy are problematic, as they do 
not include 3 percent of institutional care (León and 
Pavolini, 2013; Multilinks Database, 2011), which, 
if added, would put the country on a similar level 
with Spain.
It should be noted that both institutional and 
home care may encompass quite different situations, 
in terms of both quality and – particularly in the case 
of home care – time/needs covered. This in turn 
affects how much is left to family members (or to 
hired help) to cover.
While institutional and home care represent forms 
of defamilialization, payments for care may have two 
different meanings. When they are unconstrained in 
their use or designed to partly compensate family car-
egivers, they represent forms of supported familial-
ism. When they must be used to pay for a hired carer, 
however, they are a form of defamilialization. 
Payments for care are widespread across the EU and 
the OECD, albeit under rather different regulations. 
Among the four countries examined in this study, 
Italy relies most heavily on payments, as its main 
form of support towards long-term care is the ‘accom-
panying allowance’, that is, a monthly allowance paid 
to a totally disabled person with no limitation on its 
use. Over the years, with ageing kinship and increased 
women’s labour force participation, this allowance, 
combined with the availability of cheap migrant 
labour, has become one of the foundations of the so-
called ‘migrant in the family’ model for addressing 
the care needs of the dependent old (Bettio et al., 
2006; Naldini and Saraceno, 2008). The caring allow-
ance, therefore, may result both in a form of explicit 
supported familialism and in an implicit means of 
supported defamilialization through the market. In 
line with supported familialism, Italy is also the only 
country to offer family caregivers the possibility to 
take time off to care for a severely dependent family 
member, that is, 3 days a month at full pay and 
6 months’ unpaid leave. The other three countries 
have made more room (with different speed and 
intensity) for partial defamilialization. Japan and 
Korea have introduced a compulsory long-term care 
Figure 2. Population 65 years old or over receiving formal long-term care, 2011 or nearest year.
Source: OECD Health at a Glance.
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insurance similar to Germany’s, with the market play-
ing a greater role as care providers compared to third-
sector actors, particularly in Korea (Chon, 2014), and, 
differently from Germany, with no option between 
receiving cash or services. In Spain, the responsibility 
for the funding of services is tripartite, shared between 
the state, the regions and the users. The preference is 
for public services, followed by cash benefits to pay 
for market services in case public services are lacking. 
The alternative of a no-strings-attached cash payment 
is, however, also present, leaving room for a type of 
supported familialism and for indirect supported defa-
milialization via the market through the ‘migrant in 
the family’ model. Migrant care workers are also pre-
sent in private households in Korea, although there is 
a specific selection insofar as only co-ethnic migrants 
are allowed (Song, 2015). From this perspective, the 
exception is Japan, where no form of ‘migrant in the 
family’ care pattern is detectable or legally possible 
(Song, 2015).
In sum, in addition to familialism by default, Italy 
relies most heavily on supported familialism with 
reduced room for defamilialization. The latter is more 
likely to occur indirectly using the ‘accompanying 
allowance’ to buy care in the (mostly migrant) labour 
market. Japan and Korea have adopted the instrument 
of compulsory insurance to pay for services, with 
Japan moving faster (Estevez-Abe and Kim, 2014). 
Spain is similar to Korea and Japan in the defamilial-
izing direction it has taken, but with a higher degree 
of defamilialization with regard to funding, to the 
extent that not only the provision of care but also its 
funding has been partly shifted outside the family to 
the public budget, while in the case of Japan and 
Korea, the responsibility for the cost has stayed with 
individuals and families who must pay for the, com-
pulsory, insurance. However, it should be noted that 
the overall expenditure in this field has remained 
much lower in Spain than in Italy and that the finan-
cial crisis seems to have reversed the process, which 
had just started (León and Pavolini, 2014). This 
shows the fragility of a policy field that had just 
begun to be consolidated and was already weakened 
by the large variability of its implementation across 
the autonomous Spanish regions.
Different familialistic profiles: a 
provisional conclusion
The data presented in this overview (synthesized in 
Table 1) demonstrate that they are useful to articu-
late the concepts of familialism and defamilializa-
tion, distinguishing between familialism by default, 
prescribed familialism and supported familialism for 
the former, and defamilialization through public pro-
vision and supported defamilialization through the 
market for the latter. In particular, the important role 
of supported (as against default or prescribed) famil-
ialism and the different paths to defamilialization 
have emerged as an important cause of cross-country 
differentiation within this family of nations. Overall, 
the more articulated conceptualization and the richer 
set of indicators used in the analysis allow a better 
interpretation and also partly disconfirm the picture 
emerging from the OECD selected data in Figure 1, 
in the second section, above.
Table 1. Cross-country and cross-area varieties of familialism.
Who is responsible for Familialism 
by default
Prescribed 
familialism
Supported 
familialism
Supported 
defamilialization 
via market
Defamilialization 
via state/
municipalities
Income support in case 
of need
I++, J+, 
K+, S
S, J−, K−
Cost of children K+, S+, I, J I, J, K, S J+, I, S−, K  
Childcare
0−2 children I+, J+, S I, J, K+, S− K+, J− I−, S+
3−5 children K K+, J+ I++, S++
Elderly non-health care I+, S I, S I−, J++, K+, S S+
I: Italy; S: Spain; K: Korea; J: Japan.
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First, the degree of (prescribed, default or sup-
ported) familialism differs not only across countries 
but also across policy areas. It is stronger in the case 
of income support than in care obligations. In the lat-
ter area, not surprisingly, it is stronger for children 
younger than 3 years of age than for older children 
and the frail old. Against this background, important 
cross-country area-specific similarities and differ-
ences emerge. Japan and Italy show the greatest 
extension of prescribed familialism with regard to 
income support obligations. Concerning childcare 
for the under 3-year-olds, Korea and Spain are the 
most defamilialized among the four countries, but 
Korea, in addition to preferring supported defamil-
ialization via market rather than via state, offers also 
the option of supported familialism, while Spain has 
the comparatively lowest degree of supported famil-
ialism in this area. In terms of the care for the frail 
old, Japan and Korea are not only the most defamil-
ialized of the four, but they also share the choice of 
supported defamilialization through the market (via 
compulsory insurance). Spain follows a similar defa-
milialization trend, but with a preference for a direct 
public intervention. Italy, on the contrary, keeps an 
uneasy balance between familialism by default, sup-
ported familialism and indirectly supported defamil-
ialization through the market.
As a provisional conclusion, one might say that, 
within a persistent strong familialistic orientation, 
Spain, at least before the crisis, was moving towards 
a greater degree of defamilialization via the state, 
while Korea and Japan, to different degrees, were 
moving in the direction of a greater (via compulsory 
insurance or state subsidies) supported defamilializa-
tion through the market, in line with the greater role 
played in these two countries by occupational wel-
fare compared to Italy and Spain (Kim, 2010). Italy’s 
profile appears less clearly defined, except for the 
strong role of defamilialization via the state in terms 
of (education focused) childcare offered to the fami-
lies with children older than 3 years of age. This 
country also appears to be the most ambivalent in 
reducing, via changes in civil law and/or via changes 
in welfare arrangements, intergenerational and gen-
der-specific obligations and interdependencies within 
families. Furthermore, from a dynamic point of view, 
Italy, which started from a comparatively higher level 
of both defamilialization and supported familialism, 
appears now an outlier in its relative immobility, 
whereas the other three countries are moving in dif-
ferent directions and with different emphases.
The introduction and the other papers in this issue 
focus precisely on the drivers of the ongoing changes 
in similarities and differences within this family of 
nations in dealing with the emerging issues of popu-
lation ageing, women’s labour force participation, 
changing balances and interests between generations 
that put familialistic welfare state arrangements 
under increasing stress.
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Notes
1. Available at: http://www.mhlw.go.jp/bunya/kodomo/
osirase/dl/h24_gaiyou_e.pdf.
2. The two sources are not fully comparable, as in the 
Multilinks case, the figures are based on official data 
for the coverage of publicly provided or publicly 
funded childcare day services. The OECD family 
data are based on attendance data for both public and 
private, publicly funded and entirely market-provided 
services. Furthermore, the OECD data for many 
countries, including EU ones, are survey-based, not 
administrative ones.
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